

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: KIM IL SUNG'S VISIT TO THE PRC

SUMMARY: THE CHINESE-NORTH KOREAN JOINT COMMUNIQUE SIGNED DURING KIM IL SUNG'S VISIT SUGGESTS THAT THE NORTH KOREANS MAY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING CHINESE ACQUIESCENCE TO A HARDER LINE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE CHINESE, FOR THEIR PART, APPEAR TO HAVE DAMPENED ANY THOUGHTS KIM MIGHT HAVE HAD OF ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT U.S. DIFFICULTIES IN INDOCHINA BY STEPPING UP MILITARY PRESSURES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. PREDICTABLY, KIM CONTINUED TO HOLD OPEN THE SOVIET OPTION BY AVOIDING ANY ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC. END SUMMARY.

1. THE PRC-NORTH KOREAN JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF APRIL 26 (RELEASED APRIL 28) APPEARS TO INDICATE THAT THE CHINESE AGREED TO TAKE A HARDER LINE ON NEGOTIATIONS ON THE KOREAN QUESTION. IN THE COMMUNIQUE, THE TWO SIDES MAKE THE STANDARD DEMAND THAT
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THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND BE DISSOLVED AND THAT U.S. FORCES

BE WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTH KOREA. HOWEVER, THE CHINESE GO FURTHER THAN USUAL BY SUPPORTING THE DPRK AS THE "SOLE LEGAL SOVEREIGN STATE OF THE KOREAN NATION" AND CONDEMNING THE UNITED STATES FOR PURSUING A "TWO KOREAS" POLICY. THESE STATEMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE CHINESE HAVE AGREED NOT TO NEGOTIATE COMPROMISES WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THE KOREAN QUESTION EITHER AT THE UNITED NATIONS OR ELSEWHERE AND TO BACK OFF FROM THEIR PROPAGANDA SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENTS.

2. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CHINESE MAY HAVE MANAGED TO COOL SOME OF KIM'S RHETORIC ON THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. NONE OF KIM'S TOUGH STATEMENTS IN HIS OPENING BANQUET SPEECH ON THE POSSIBILITY A NEW WAR -- E.G. ACCUSATIONS THAT THE SOUTH WAS STEPPING UP WAR PREPARATIONS OR THAT THE NORTH HAD NOTHING TO LOSE IN A WAR BUT THE DEMARCATION LINE--SURVIVED THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE. AND AN UNUSUAL STATEMENT THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAD "TRUST IN" KIM IL SUNG MAY HAVE BEEN A VEILED REFERENCE TO A PROMISE BY THE NORTH KOREAN LEADER THAT HE WOULD NOT STEP UP MILITARY PROVOCATIONS TO A LEVEL WHICH WOULD RISK WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

3. THE WORDING OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE KOREAN "COMPLETE AGREEMENT" WITH THE CHINESE DID NOT EXTEND TO THE SUBJECT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. PREDICTABLY, KIM CAREFULLY RETAINED HIS OPTIONS WITH THE SOVIETS BY AVOIDING ANY REFERENCE TO "MODERN REVISIONISM" OR OTHER IMPLIED CRITICISMS OF THE SOVIET UNION DURING HIS PEKING VISIT. THE NEAREST HE CAME TO CRITICIZING SOVIET POLICY IN THE COMMUNIQUE WAS AN AMBIGUOUSLY WORDED CRITICISM OF "IMPERIALISM" USE OF THE "SIGNBOARD OF PEACE" AS A TRICK, WHICH COULD BE SEEN AS AIMED AGAINST DETENTE IN A CHINESE INTERPRETATION AND AGAINST COMPROMISE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN THE KOREAN INTERPRETATION.

4. COMMENT: WHILE THE EVIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC RECORD REMAINS SKETCHY, WE SUSPECT THE CHINESE AND NORTH KOREANS ACCOMPLISHED THEIR BASIC GOAL DURING KIM'S VISIT OF COORDINATING THEIR APPROACHES TO KOREAN QUESTIONS. WE SUSPECT THE CHINESE MADE CLEAR TO KIM THAT SHARPLY INCREASED TENSION OR ACTUAL CONFLICT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA WOULD BE CONTRARY TO PRC FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS, BUT
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IN EXCHANGE WE CAN PROBABLY EXPECT A TOUGHER PEKING STANCE ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO KOREA. BUSH

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